This paper provides an analysis of the payment card market by positing new microfoundations for the two-sidedness of the industry. This allows us to examine the evolution of the industry both in the short-run (the network "chicken-egg" dynamics) and in the long-run (dynamics resulting from changes in costs and income). Our analyses show that declining card service cost is consistent with increasing interchange fees. This is because a monopoly card network, while internalizing the two-sided market effects, has the incentive to inflate the nominal value of card transactions. As card service costs decline, lowering card fees to consumers and raising fees to merchants helps to boost its demand and profit. In addition our results show that the social planner prefers lower merchant fees and higher consumer fees, relative to the monopoly outcome. Furthermore, a price ceiling on merchant fees may improve welfare.
1 Introduction
Motivation
As credit and debit cards become an increasingly prominent forms of payment, the structure and performance of the payment card industry are drawing increasing scrutiny. Many controversial issues are raised about interchange fees -the fees paid to card issuers when merchants accept their credit or debit cards for purchase. 1 Interchange fees are typically set by card networks and in many instances they are considered by competition authorities to be too high. 2 Particularly, interchange fees in the US are among the highest in the world, and they have been increasing in recent years despite falling costs in the card industry. 3 Following Baxter (1983) , an important antitrust literature has discussed the potential anticompetitive effects of the collective determination of interchange fees within payment card associations. However, no systematic theoretical analysis was available until very recently when several formal models of the payment card industry was developed (e.g., Schmalensee 2002 , Rochet and Tirole 2003, Wright 2003 Wright , 2004 ). These models aim to provide a more rigorous analysis of pricing and volumes in card payment systems. The framework that they use highlights the existence of common patterns between this industry and other network industries including the Internet, media, video games and software, which have been termed "two-sided" markets.
The two-sided market theories emphasize the fundamental externality in card payment systems. Every card transaction necessarily involves two users: a cardholder and a merchant. 1 Visa and MasterCard provide card services through member financial institutions (card-issuing banks and merchant-acquiring banks), and are called "four-party" systems. Amex and Discover primarily handle all card issuing and acquiring by themselves, and are called "three-party" systems. In both "four-party" and "three-party" systems, merchants are charged fees for accepting card payments, and the fees are mainly paid to card issuers (e.g., the issuing banks in a "four-party" system or the network itself in a "three-party" system). 2 Around the world, many competition authorities and central banks have recently taken action on the interchange pricing. Particularly, in Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia mandated a sizeable reduction in credit-card interchange fees in 2003, and is currently re-evaluating the regulation. Meanwhile, UK, EU, Belgium, Israel, Poland, Portugal, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland have made similar decisions and moves. Action on interchange fees in the US has been mainly driven by private litigation. In 2005, about 50 antitrust cases were filed contesting interchange fees, claiming nearly $1 trillion damages. Due to the similarity of the actions, they have been consolidated into a single case which is ongoing (Weiner and Wright 2006 ). 3 The current interchange rates, varying by merchants' business type, average approximately 1.75 percent of transaction value in the US. In 2005, American card issuers made $30.7 billion (about $270 per household) from interchange fees, an increase of 85 percent since 2001 (Wang, 2007) .
Cardholders benefit from their holding a card only if their cards are accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from the card only if a sufficient number of consumers use it. Therefore, a payment card network can only function effectively if sufficient numbers of both cardholders and merchants participate in the network and use the cards. Because of the positive externality, it is reasonable for the card network to price differently to cardholders and merchants in order to effectively balance the demand on the two sides of the market. 4 An important question is whether the interchange fees or card fees in general could be set at the "wrong level." These theories show that, although the socially optimal and privately optimal levels of card fees both depend on the same factors (e.g., issuing costs, acquiring costs, cardholders' and merchants' demand elasticities, market structure, and bargaining power of the parties), they are not equal in general. However, given various complications of the models, including imperfect competition, in general there is no way to tell that the card fees are systematically too high or too low, as compared with socially optimal levels. Wright (2004) shows that when merchants compete and consumers are fully informed as to whether merchants accept cards, the profit and welfare maximizing fee coincide for a non-trivial set of cases.
While these two-sided market theories advanced our understanding of the card payment systems, there are weaknesses with their micro-foundations. First, these theories typically assume a distribution of unobservable "convenience benefits" from the use of a payment card for both sides of the market, but do not really explain where those benefits come from. As a result, those benefits are often referred to in nonpecuniary terms that cannot be spent by consumers. While that assumption may fit other two-sided markets, it does not describe payment demand well, as consumers derive their demand for a payment device from their underlying demand to purchase a good or service; payment devices themselves do not impart a separable consumption benefit to consumers; and a similar argument holds for merchant benefits. Second, these theories assume consumers have a fixed demand for goods invariant with respect to their payment choices. This 4 Payment card systems are not the only case of such two-sided markets. Rochet and Tirole (2003) provide a detailed analysis of other examples, such as the software industry, video games, internet portals, medias, and shopping malls. In all these industries as well, the platforms may price differently to each side of the markets in order to balance the demand, while making a profit overall.
is not realistic because consumers' purchasing power does depend on their payment choices. In fact, the monetary benefit has always been the most important incentive for consumers to choose among different payment options. Third, these theories typically assume merchants engage in a special form of imperfect competition (e.g., Hotelling). While this is handy for considering merchants' business stealing motives for accepting cards, it complicates the overall picture and makes the social welfare analysis very difficult, if not impossible. When one combines the unspecified source of firm heterogeneity in the distribution of merchant benefits from the use of a payment device with the strategic effects of imperfect competition and differences in bargaining power, the welfare analyses in the existing theories is quite formidable.
In contrast, our model provides better microfoundations for a two-sided market theory for the payment card industry. Our approach looks at consumers as deriving utility from their consumption of goods which they purchase subject to an income constraint. The payment method the consumer uses does not yield utility directly, but instead imposes a frictional cost on their purchases. Therefore, the model we explore ignores any nonmonetary characteristics of the payment device, and examines adoption and use in the environment in which the monetary characteristics of payment devices are their only raison d'b etre. 5 Meanwhile, in contrast to the existing models, we assume a contestable market for merchants.
The advantages of employing a contestable model are significant. First, a contestable market is a more applicable model to many industries than any particular model of imperfect competition.
Second, assuming contestable merchants simplifies the welfare analysis. Because merchants make zero profit, calculating social welfare is boiled down to calculating consumer surplus. Third, and the most important, the constable market assumption helps to uncover a fundamental 5 By focusing on the moneyness of payment devices, we might be criticized for overlooking nonmonetary benefits consumers or merchants might derive from their use. We offer three defences. First, the monetary nature of payment devices is arguably their primary purpose. Second, many convenience benefits of payment devices (e.g., protection from theft or saving of time), are closely related with the income and spending of the consumer, and are therefore better captured by our model through the variable cost of use of the payment device. Third, it may be appropriate to model both the monetary and other, direct, benefits of a payment device. But we believe that only by first investigating the adoption pattern of a monetary payment device purely via its derived demand can we understand the circumstances under which sellers of payment devices will choose to employ a strategy of tying a direct benefit (not related to the income of the consumer) to the use of the device, and determining on which side of the market those benefits might be offered. By overlooking the monetary nature of payment devices, one is apt to misunderstand the basic asymmetry between the economic roles of the consumer and the merchant.
incentive behind payment card pricing that is overlooked in the standard models: A profitmaximizing payment card network cares not only about internalizing the two-sided market externality, but also inflating the nominal value of card transactions in order to raise the demand for its services. Given that merchants are competitive, lowering card fees to consumers helps to inflate the transaction values spent using cards, so the card network pursues high merchant and low consumer fees-i.e., high interchange fees. However, from a consumer welfare point of view, lowering card fees to merchants and raising them to consumers might be preferred because this helps to lower the retail prices and raise consumers' real purchases (where we include both consumers who use cards and those who don't use cards, but use cash instead). Accordingly, our model shows that imposing a ceiling for interchange fees may help suppress the inflation and improve consumer welfare.
Our analyses show that the decline of card service costs is consistent with increasing interchange fees and consumer rewards, a puzzle pointed out in Hayashi (2005) and Weiner and Wright (2006) . This is related to the inflation incentive just discussed. A monopoly card network has the incentive to inflate the card transaction value in order to create more demand for its services. Given competitive merchants, lowering card fees to consumers rather than to the merchants help inflate the value of card transactions, so the card network prefers high interchange fees. As card service costs decline over time, the card network is able to further raise the interchange fees, inflate the value of transactions and hence extract more profits out of the system. This finding is consistent with Wang (2007) , who found card networks who set interchange fees in a mature card market without adoption externality also have the incentive of inflating retail prices.
As we discussed, our model of payment card economics is constructed on a set of better microfoundations. In addition to the new findings we mentioned above, this approach also yields clear and testable hypotheses about the evolution of two-sided payment card markets.
Consider the introduction of a payment device with a high fixed but low variable cost of use (for each user, merchant and consumer). More affluent consumers, with higher levels of consumption and purchases, will choose to adopt the device prior to less affluent consumers. For merchants, and 2). 6 In contrast, the literature that overlooks the monetary nature of payment devices does not yield such straightforward empirical conclusions without additional assumptions about how the specific convenience benefits are distributed among consumers and merchants, and how that distribution covaries with consumer income on the one hand, and merchant size on the other.
In the payment card context, it has previously been pointed out (e.g., Wright 2003) that a merchant accepting both cards and cash and who is subject to competition from specialized merchants accepting only cash or cards, would be competed out of business. However, we find that large merchants who serve both cash and card customers do survive the threat of entry from specialized merchants. They survive the threat of entry because of the presence of fixed adoption costs of cards. Because the adoption costs can be spread over a large number of transactions, and because the variable fees of card use are less than the variable costs of handling cash, the 6 Data source: Evans and Schmalensee (2005) , Paying with Plastic, 2nd edition. Our model yields an additional insight that to our knowledge has not been discussed in the literature, but is consistent with many clear examples. In our model, if a merchant serves both types of consumers, those who pay with cash and those who prefer to pay with cards, the cash users are facing a lower price than they would if the store only accepted cash. Furthermore, the merchant faces a higher marginal cost of serving a cash customer than of serving a card customer. Many other papers in the literature have the result that the card customer is the higher marginal cost customer, and even assert that the cash customer "cross-subsidizes" the card customers through higher prices they pay to the merchant. We find quite the contrary result. Furthermore, we observe many cases in which our result is obviously consistent with empirical facts. Consider the introduction of electronic roadway toll-collection systems. Prior to their introduction long lines often characterize the toll booths. After their introduction and adoption by some drivers, cash-users enjoy much shorter lines (a better overall price than in the alternative case of no electronic toll-collection system), and still require a toll-booth attendant, imposing higher marginal costs on the toll system operator. No one suggests that cash users are subsidizing those who adopt electronic toll-collection payment devices. We suggest that represents a clear empirical example of the general case.
Based on the contestability of the market and on payment card adoption costs, our equilibrium is characterized by three categories of merchant sizes. Large merchants adopt payment cards and set a price that is lower than cash customers would experience at a cash-only merchants. So the large merchants attract customers who pay either with cash or the card. Medium size merchants, in contrast, are specialized. Some of these merchants accept only cash. The others adopt cards, but set a price that is higher than the competing cash-only merchants. They attract only consumers that use cards, because those consumers are better-off paying the higher price using their card, because cards are cost-saving to them overall. Finally, small merchants are all cash-only merchants. These predictions are broadly consistent with what we observe in reality, but are not implied by the existing theories.
Road Map
In the next section we lay out our model in greater detail and derive some preliminary results.
In section 3 we analyze the equilibria of our model, and compare the market outcomes under a monopoly card network, under a Ramsey social planner, and under a policy that an interchange fee ceiling is imposed. In section 5 we offer concluding remarks.
The Model
Our model studies pricing, adoption and usage of monetary payment devices. We first lay out the environment in which only one payment device, referred to as cash, is in use. Then we will consider the introduction of an alternative device, which we refer to as a payment card.
We model the consumers as having generalized Cobb-Douglas preferences across a range of goods. They take prices as given. Each consumer is endowed with income, which is distributed across the population of consumers according to known cumulative distribution function. The merchant side of our model is quite stylized. Each merchant competes in a contestable market for the single good the merchant sells, and prices are set at the zero profit level. The size of an individual merchant is hence tied to the consumers' demand.
Consumers and merchants are both presented with the option to adopt a new payment device that offers a lower variable cost of use, but a higher fixed cost relative to the pre-existing alternative. They each make their optimal adoption decision taking the other's choice as given.
The model yields a two-sided market under our structure of the heterogeneity of consumer incomes and merchant sizes, the fixed adoption costs, and, finally, under the assumption of price coherence by merchants that accept both payment devices. 7 We then examine the equilibrium market outcome under a monopoly card network, under a Ramsey social planner, and under a policy that an interchange fee ceiling is imposed.
Pre-card Market Environment
The economy is composed of a continuum of merchants of measure unity. Each merchant locates in a physical store and sells a distinct product α. The store facility is sunk and the market is contestable. Let c α be non-payment cost for good α. Merchants incur transaction cost τ m per dollar for accepting cash, which includes handling, storage, and safekeeping expenses. The competition requires zero profit, so the cash price for good α is determined as p α,c , where
A consumer, indexed by her income I, has generalized Cobb-Douglas preference. She would like to consume all varieties of products, and maximizes her utility subject to her income I:
where α ∈ [α, α] is the preference parameter distributed with cdf G(α), x α,I is her quantity of demand for good α, and τ c is the transaction cost to the consumer for using cash. 7 The assumption of "price coherence" requires that merchants who adopt cards cannot price discriminate based on the consumer's choice of payment method. This assumption is a common one in the payment card literature. A restriction on price discrimination is used in many areas of economics, and is an empirically testable assumption. Therefore, the demand and spending of consumer I on good α can be determined as
.
Across consumers, the income I ∈ [I, I] is distributed with cdf function F (I) and mean E(I).
Normalize the aggregate measure of consumer to be unity. At equilibrium, market supply equals demand, so the market output and value for product α are as follows:
Card Adoption and Usage
At time T , a payment innovation, referred to as a payment card, is introduced. The payment card service is provided by a monopoly card network, who charges merchants and consumers a proportional fee f m and f c respectively. 8 The costs of providing the payment card service are d m and d c to merchants and consumers respectively. For merchants and consumers, there is a per-period adoption cost k m (e.g., a fixed cost of renting card-processing equipment) and k c (e.g., a fixed cost of maintaining bank balance or credit score). At equilibrium, large merchants and wealthy consumers have an advantage in adopting the payment card. This can be shown in the following equilibrium we construct: Given merchants α ≥ α 0 accept the card, consumers of income I ≥ I 0 would like to adopt the card, and vice versa.
Merchants' Choice
Merchants take consumers' card adoption as given to make their card acceptance decision.
Because of competition in contestable markets, merchants fall into three categories based on their transaction volume: (1) Large merchants (α ≥ α 1 ) accept payment cards and charge price 8 The development of a card network features enormous initial investment and strong adoption externality. Consequently, only a small number of card networks exist and they enjoy significant market power. In most countries, there is one monopoly card network or a few oligopolistic networks (if oligopoly networks collude, they act as a monopoly). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume a monopoly card network. Also, for simplicity, we study a "three-party" card system in this paper, and our results can be easily applied to the "four-party" system. p α,d ≤ p α,c so that they are patronized by both card and cash customers; (2) Intermediate merchants (α 0 ≤ α < α 1 ) specialize. They either accept payment cards and charge p α,d , where
, so that they are patronized only by card customers, or they do not accept payment cards and charge p α,c so that they only serve cash customers. (3) Small merchants (α < α 0 ) do not accept payment cards and charge p α,c , so that all customers shop there with cash.
As we will show next, the thresholds α 0 and α 1 are determined endogenously, particularly by the card service fees f m and f c set by the card network. Figure 3 illustrate this intuitively.
Moreover, because merchants who accept payment cards still have to accept cash, the card network can never charge card users a fee higher than cash cost, in other words, f c < τ c has to
hold. Otherwise, no consumer will ever use a payment card.
Category (1): α ≥ α 1 Merchants in this category charge p α,d ≤ p α,c and receive revenue from both card and cash customers:
where
Contestability requires zero profit so that revenue equals cost,
Equations (1) and (2) pin down the price p α,d :
, where
Note Eq (3) suggests no category (1) merchant exists if f m ≥ τ m (i.e., α 1 = ∞).
Category (2): α 0 ≤ α < α 1 Merchants in this group specialize. For each product, there are two merchants. One accepts payment cards and charges p α,d , where
it is patronized only by card customers. The other does not accept payment cards and charge p α,c so it only serves cash customers.
A card merchant receives revenue only from card customers and earns zero profit, which
(Note f c < τ c is required for any consumer to ever use payment cards). Hence,
group, where α 1 is given in Eq (3) and α 0 is determined by
If f m ≥ τ m and
, Eqs (3) and (4) suggest no merchant accepts payment cards. Hence, the card network never prices f m and f c in that range.
, small merchants α < α 0 are in the third category.
Given their small transaction volumes, accepting payment cards will result
Therefore, they only accept cash.
Remarks As shown above in Fig. 3 , different categories of merchants may appear depending on values of parameters. In addition, values of α and α may further affect our results in Fig 3. Without loss of generality, we assume that α 0 < α in our following discussion. 
In contrast, if she adopts a payment card, she enjoys utility V d ,
Therefore, card adoption requires V c < V d , which implies
Equation (5) suggests the adopters' income has to be over the threshold level I 0
Two-sided Market Interactions
The interactions between consumers' card adoption and merchants' card acceptance can be summarized as follows. Given τ c > f c and
, we have
To simplify the analysis, we introduce the following notations:
Accordingly, the card adoption thresholds (6) - (8) can be rewritten as follows. Given τ c > f c
Monopoly Network and Social Planner
Considering card adoption and usage externalities in the two-sided market, the monopoly card network and the social planner would set card fees to achieve their goals: The former maximizes the network profit and the latter maximizes the consumer surplus. 9 
Monopoly Network's Problem
The monopoly card network would like to maximize its profit through card pricing (f c , f m ). Note in our model, which abstracts from the "four-party" model to a simpler three-party model, the card network plays the role of both acquiring and issuing banks. With an assumption of costless, competitive acquiring and issuing banks, the interchange fee would simply equal the merchant service fee. As a result , in our model the interchange fee is simply f m .
Max
Note that for the monopoly card network, the demand for card services is given by
It clearly shows that the card network has incentive to set card fees to internalize the two-sided market externality because f c and f m affect the adoption thresholds α 0 and I 0 . This is consistent with findings in standard models. However, in addition to that, our model shows that f c but not f m also enters the card demand directly. This is due to the "inflation effect." Given merchants are competitive, lowering card fees to consumers inflates consumer nominal spending on card so it creates more demand for card services. In contrast, lowering card fees to merchants would not increase nominal card spending, though it does lower retail prices and increase consumer real purchase. Therefore, this "inflation effect" provides the card network additional incentive to pursue high interchange fee f m .
Social Planner's Problem
As a payment innovation, card adoption and usage improve social welfare. This can be shown in the following welfare comparison between a cash economy and a card economy.
Recall in a cash economy, an individual consumer I enjoys the utility level U I,c :
In an economy with payment cards, a consumer decide whether to adopt a payment card based on her income. For a card consumer I ≥ I 0 , her utility is
while for a cash consumer I < I 0 , her utility is
Therefore, an individual receives different welfare gain depending on her income. For a card consumer I ≥ I 0 , her welfare gain is
while for a cash consumer I < I 0 , her welfare gain is
This result is intuitive: In a card economy, a cash consumer benefits from lower prices charged by merchants in category (1) if those merchants exist; a card consumer enjoys utility gains from all card merchants in categories (1) and (2), subject to card adoption and usage costs.
Given the above utility measures, the social planner would like to maximize consumer welfare gains subject to the adoption incentive constraints of merchants and consumers as well as the network balanced-budget constraint (Ramsey pricing). The social planner's problem is as follows:
s.t. Eqs (9), (10), (11) , (12), (13), (14), (15)
Industry Dynamics
To explore the implications of our model on card industry dynamics, we consider an explicit example. Assume α ∈ [0, 1] is uniformly distributed where E(α) = 1/2, and I ∈ [0, ∞) is exponentially distributed where F (I) = 1 − e (−λI) and E(I) = 1/λ. 10 Note that E α>α 0 (α) = 
Short-run (Transitional) Dynamics
As expected, two-sided market interactions in our model suggest multiple equilibria. Assume
Eqs (11) and (13) can be rewritten into
where S = ln
) (see the Appendix for the proof).
Characterizing Eq (L1), we have
Characterizing Eq (L2), we have is stable but the low equilibrium is not. As a result, the card network has incentive to push the card adoption to overcome the low equilibrium. Our analysis suggests if the initial card adoption is high enough, the market will evolve to the high equilibrium. Otherwise, card adoption may fail, and suffer no adoption.
Figure 4: Interaction of Merchants and Consumers in Card Adoption
dα 0 dI 0 > 0, d 2 α 0 dI 2 0 < 0.
Long-run Dynamics
The long-run industry dynamics are characterized by the time path of the high-adoption equilibrium. Given the complexity of the problem, most of our analyses rely on numerical simulations.
In the benchmark simulation, we show how the industry equilibrium evolves as the card service costs d c + d m fall. 12 Then, we adjust the values of k c , k m and 1/λ to see how the industry dynamics would be affected by adoption costs and consumer income.
Monopoly Outcome
At market equilibrium, the card network solves the following problem to maximize its profit: consumers spend more on card services to pay for an increasing card transaction volume, and the card payment spending to card sales ratio decreases. 13 Meanwhile, cash transaction volume declines and the cash cost to sales ratio is fixed at τ m + τ c . In total, the society pays less for payment services, and the total payment spending to total sales ratio decreases.
We then study the effects of k m and k c . In the simulation of Case 2, we keep k m + k c = 320
as in the benchmark case, but set k m = 120 and k c = 200. The results show, compared to the benchmark case, the network now charges higher card fee f m to merchants who have a reduced adoption cost, but lowers the card fee f c to consumers who have a higher adoption cost. Because of lower adoption costs to merchant and higher adoption costs to consumers, more merchants accept card but fewer consumers use cards compared to the benchmark case. The reallocation of card adoption costs also has welfare implications: card users and cash users now have lower welfare gains compared to the benchmark case. In terms of payment expenditures, card adoption and service spending as well as the card transaction volume are lower, while cash costs and cash transaction volume are higher compared to the benchmark case.
In the simulation of Case 3, we reduce both k c and k m by equal proportion compared to the benchmark case, e.g., set k 0
The results show, compared to the benchmark case, the network now charges higher card fees f m and f c , so the card markup is higher. In spite of the higher card fees, the lower adoption costs induce more merchants and consumers to adopt card compared to the benchmark case. Consequently, the card consumers enjoy more welfare gains. Meanwhile, merchants and consumers spend more on card adoption and service fees to pay for a higher card transaction volume, and the card payment spending to card sales ratio is higher than the benchmark case, while cash costs and cash transaction volume is lower. The total payment spending to sales ratio could be higher or lower than the benchmark case depending on the value of card service costs d m + d c .
In Case 4, we raise the mean consumer income 1/λ 0 = 12500 so that λ 0 /λ = 0.8. The simulation results show an equivalent change to the card pricing, adoption and welfare gains as the Case 3 where k 0 c /k c = k 0 m /k m = 0.8. Meanwhile, a higher income leads to more spending on 13 The card service spending includes both card adoption costs and service fees for consumers and merchants.
card and cash payments, and more card and cash transaction volumes than Case 3, while the payment spending to sales ratios are the same.
That the growth of income and the decline of adoption costs have equivalent effects on card pricing and adoption is not a surprise. In fact, this can be proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The monopoly card network profit maximization under the parameter values
(1/λ, k c , k m ) and (θ/λ, θk c , θk m ) requires the same card pricing (f c , f m ) and adoption (1−F (I 0 ),
Proof. This can be shown by constructing a contradiction. Assume (f * c , f * m , I * 0 , α * 0 ) generates the maximal network profit π * for the parameterization (1/λ, k c , k m ). Then, for the parameterization 
Social Optimum
The social planner maximizes the consumer surplus subject to the adoption incentive constraints of merchants and consumers as well as the network balanced-budget constraint: to pay for a higher card transaction volume, so the card payment spending to card sales ratio decreases. Meanwhile, cash transaction volume declines and the cash cost to sales ratio is fixed at τ m + τ c . In total, the society pays less for payment services, and the total payment spending to total sales ratio decreases.
We then study the effects of k c and k m . In the simulation of Case 2, we keep k c + k m = 320
as in the benchmark case, but set k m = 120 and k c = 200. The results show, compared to the benchmark case, the social planner now charges higher card fee f m to merchants who have a reduced adoption cost, but lowers card fee f c to consumers who have a higher adoption cost.
Because of lower adoption costs to merchant and higher adoption costs to consumers, more merchant accept cards but fewer consumers use cards compared to the benchmark case. The reallocation of card adoption costs also has welfare implications: card users have less welfare gains while cash users have more compared to the benchmark case. In terms of payment expenditures, card adoption and service spending as well as the card transaction volume are lower, while cash costs and cash transaction volume are higher compared to the benchmark case.
The results show, compared to the benchmark case, the social planner now charges lower card fees f m to merchants but higher card fee f c to consumers, and the card markup remains zero. Under the lower adoption costs, more merchants and consumers adopt card compared to the benchmark case, and the consumers, both the card users and cash users, enjoy more welfare gains. Meanwhile, merchants and consumers spend less on card adoption and service fees to pay for a higher card transaction volume, and the card payment spending to card sales ratio is lower than the benchmark case, so are cash costs and cash transaction volume. Consequently, the total payment spending to sales ratio is lower than the benchmark case.
In the simulation of case 4, we raise the consumer income 1/λ 0 = 12500 so that λ 0 /λ = 0.8.
As we found before in the monopoly outcome, this causes an equivalent change to the card pricing, adoption and welfare gains as the simulation of Case 3 where
Meanwhile, a higher income leads to more spending on card and cash payments, and more card and cash transaction volumes than Case 3, while the payment spending to sales ratios are the same.
Comparing Monopoly Outcome and Social Optimum
Several key findings stand out as we compare the monopoly outcome and the social optimum. However, other results are different. Figure A5 in the Appendix compares the simulation results of Case 1 between the monopoly outcome and the social optimum. We find that under the same parameterization, the monopoly network charges a much higher interchange fee f m than the social planner. As a result, both merchant and consumer card adoption are lower, and fewer card merchants serve cash customers. These lead to lower welfare gains to both card consumers and cash consumers. In terms of payment expenditures, the monopoly network requires merchants and consumers to spend more on card adoption and service fees to pay for a lower card transaction volume than the social optimum, so the card payment spending to card sales ratio is higher. Also, cash costs and cash transaction volume is higher than the social optimum.
As the card service costs d m + d c fall, the monopoly card network raises the interchange fee f m to merchants but lowers card fee f c to consumers, and raises the card pricing markup
Meanwhile, a decreasing number of card merchants are patronized by cash users so cash users gain less welfare. In contrast, the social planner would lower card fees to both merchants and consumers, and keep the card markup at zero. Meanwhile, an increasing number of card merchants are patronized by cash users, and both card users and cash users gain more welfare.
Furthermore, Figs. A2 and A4 show when the card adoption costs k c and k m fall, the monopoly network charges higher card fees f m and f c , and raises the card markup. Meanwhile, merchants and consumers spend more on card adoption and service fees to pay for a higher card transaction volume, and the card payment spending to card sales ratio becomes higher. In contrast, the social planner lowers card fee to merchants and keeps the card markup at zero.
Meanwhile, merchants and consumers spend less on card adoption and service fees to pay for a higher card transaction volume, and the card payment spending to card sales ratio becomes lower.
What causes the fundamental differences between the monopoly outcome and social optimum? The answer lies on their different objectives. The card network maximizes its profit for providing card service, so it cares only about the card users not the cash users. Moreover, given competitive merchants, lowering card fees to consumers help inflate the value of card transactions, so the card network prefers high interchange fees. As card service costs decline over time, the card network is able to further raise the interchange fees, inflate the value of transactions and hence extract more profits out of the system. In contrast, the social planner maximizes the consumer surplus, so it cares both card users and cash users, and cares about consumers' real purchases rather than their nominal spending. Therefore, the monopoly card pricing and output are very different from the social optimum, a finding in contrast with previous literature, including Schmalensee (2002) and Wright (2003 Wright ( , 2004 ).
Interchange Fee Applications
Our model provides a general framework to study the pricing, adoption and usage of payment devices. Particularly, it sheds lights on several puzzles surrounding the payment card interchange fees.
First, for some payment card systems (e.g., debit cards in the U.S.), why did the interchange fees flow from consumers to merchants in the early years only to have the direction reversed more recently? More generally, why have interchange fees increased in recent years?
As the card service cost d c + d m is decreased over time, as would occur with technological progress, our model suggests card fees would increase for merchants but decrease for consumers.
As we explained earlier, this can be understood as attempting to maximize card network profit.
Furthermore, our theory suggests that consumers might have to pay interchange fees in early years: early in the evolution of debit cards, there was a higher adoption cost k m for merchants relative to consumers as merchants had to install new card terminals, while consumers were endowed with debit cards through their banks' delivery to them of ATM cards (which then could function as debit cards). Consequently, our model would suggest that consumers had to bear a larger share of the card service charges. Later on, as the merchants' adoption cost k m declined (as general purpose credit and debit card terminals became available, and terminals fell in cost) more card cost was shifted to the merchants and the interchange fees could reverse direction.
Also, our model shows that monopoly card network tends to pursue higher interchange fee than the social planner. In light of the recent debates and actions on interchange regulation, our model provides a natural framework for conducting policy experiments. For example, we conduct a simulation using the same parameterization as Case 1, where we set τ m = 0.05, the monopoly card network then has to charge higher card fees to the consumer side but the overall card markup becomes lower. As a result, the merchant card adoption is higher, and consumer card adoption is lower. Meanwhile, the percentage of category (1) merchants becomes higher, and both card users and cash users enjoy higher welfare gains. In terms of payment expenditures, merchants and consumers spend less on card adoption and service fees to pay for an lower nominal card transaction volume, and the card payment spending to card sales ratio decreases. In contrast, cash transaction volume rises and the cash cost to sales ratio is fixed at τ m + τ c . In total, the society pays less for payment services, and the total payment spending to total sales ratio decreases.
Conclusion
This paper provides a new two-sided market theory to study the pricing, adoption and usage of payment devices, in which we emphasize the heterogeneity in consumer income and merchant size. Unlike many existing studies, we assume a competitive economy where both merchants and consumers behave nonstrategically. The richness of the strategic approach is sacrificed in favor of a focus on the interplay between individual merchant and consumer decision-making and aggregate industry characteristics. As a result, our model provides a convenient framework to study the evolution of the payment industry both in the short run (network "chicken-egg" dynamics) and long-run (dynamics due to cost and income changes), and offers further insights into the related competition policy issues.
The benefits to adopting a payment innovation-a payment card-in our model are pecuniary.
Adoption of a payment card by a consumer or acceptance of payment cards by merchants at the point of sale yield lower marginal costs of making the payment. At the same time, using cards impose fixed per period adoption costs. Given these assumptions our two-sided model yields some unique insights. One of our first result shows that in equilibrium in our model, high-income consumers and high-value or volume merchants are likely to adopt card devices earlier than others. That implication of our model is both consistent with empirical measurements as well as significantly different from the existing literature, which does not yield such a straightforward conclusion without many additional assumptions. In another difference with existing models, cash users in our model benefit when a store has sales paid for both by cards and cash, and the cash customers impose higher marginal costs on the merchant. In our model, cash users do not "cross-subsidize" card users.
Our analyses show that the decline of card service costs is consistent with increasing interchange fees and consumer rewards. This is because a monopoly card network, while internalizing the two-sided market externality, has the incentive to inflate the card transaction value in order to create more demand for its services. Given competitive merchants, lowering card fees to consumers rather than to the merchants help inflate the value of card transaction, so the card network prefers high interchange fees. As card service costs decline over time, the card network is able to further raise the interchange fees, inflate the value of transactions and hence extract more profits out of the system. In contrast, the model shows that the social planner would prefer lower interchange fees than the monopoly card network, and imposing a ceiling on the interchange fee may improve consumer welfare. These findings provide some support for the ongoing investigations that competition authorities around the world are taking on the payment card interchange fees.
There are many avenues for further research. Wang (2007) examines four-party payment card systems, but without adoption costs by consumers and merchants. Further extensions to this environment would be useful. Models of the vertical restraints imposed by card networks would also be of interest in this model and its extensions. Finally, modeling consumer credit constraints and the provision of credit via the payment device is another important direction for future research.
Therefore, we derive
)}. Equation (13) can then be rewritten into
).
Simulations (Figs. A1-A6)
The simulations are conducted for the equilibrium market outcome under a monopoly card network and under a social planner who maximizes consumer surplus. There are four cases with the following parameterization.
Simulation Parameterization (Cases 1-4) The simulation results are presented in the attached Figs A1-A6 as follows.
• Figure A1 compares monopoly outcomes for Cases 1 and 2.
• Figure A2 compares monopoly outcomes for Cases 1, 3 and 4.
• Figure A3 compares social optimal outcomes for Cases 1 and 2.
• Figure A4 compares social optimal outcomes for Cases 1, 3 and 4.
• Figure A5 compares monopoly outcome and social optimum for Case 1.
• Figure 
